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Abstract: 
To ensure the safety of operations in safety-critical systems, it is necessary to maintain operators’ 
situation awareness (SA) at a high level. A situation awareness support system (SASS) has therefore been 
developed to handle uncertain situations [1]. This paper aims to systematically evaluate the enhancement 
of SA in SASS by applying a multi-perspective approach. The approach consists of two SA metrics, 
SAGAT and SART, and one workload metric, NASA-TLX. The first two metrics are used for the direct 
objective and subjective measurement of SA, while the third is used to estimate operator workload. The 
approach is applied in a safety-critical environment called residue treater, located at a chemical plant in 
which a poor human-system interface reduced the operator’s SA and caused one of the worst accidents in 
US history. A counterbalanced within-subjects experiment is performed using a virtual environment 
interface with and without the support of SASS. The results indicate that SASS improves operators’ SA, 
and specifically has benefits for SA levels 2 and 3. In addition, it is concluded that SASS reduces operator 
workload, although further investigations in different environments with a larger number of participants 
have been suggested. 
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1 Introduction 
Many high-hazard industries have focused on a range of contributing factors to industrial 
accidents in an attempt to reduce the accident rate as much as possible, in the wake of several 
high impact disasters such as those at Bhopal, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Most industrial 
accidents typically occur after a chain of organizational failures and human error, of which the 
share of human-factor causes is estimated to be 70–80% [2, 3]. Among the human-factor causes, 
the ability of operators to understand what is going on their worksite environment is a critical 
element in preventing accidents. This cognitive ability is referred to as situation awareness (SA) 
and indicates a high level of awareness of task and environmental conditions, as well as an 
ability to predict how conditions may change in the near future and understand how situations 
will develop [3]. To date, several SA models such as Taylor [4], Endsley [5], Adams et al. [6], 
and Bendy and Meister [7] have been developed; of these, Endsley’s model has received the 
most attention from the human factor community. Endsley’s three-level model describes SA as 
―the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future‖. It 
introduces SA as a state of knowledge in the human mind that has three levels: (1) The 
perception of relevant elements in the environment; (2)The comprehension of the meaning of 
these elements in respect of goals; and (3) The projection of the state of these elements in the 
near future [5]. 
The three-level model of SA has been used as a justification for structuring computer-
supported SA systems in a variety of domains, such as maritime security [8, 9], military services 
[10-13], the aviation domain [14] and business intelligence systems [15]. We have recently 
developed a cognition-driven decision support system called the situation awareness support 
system (SASS) to manage abnormal situations in safety-critical environments [1]. SASS 
consists of four major elements: 1) a situation data collection unit that takes into account online 
conditions based on monitoring systems to provide the current state of the observable variables; 
2) a situation assessment unit that uses the capabilities of dynamic Bayesian networks (DBN) to 
model operators’ mental models about abnormal situations, and a fuzzy logic system to 
resemble operators’ thinking when individuals are confronted with these abnormal situations; 3) 
a situation recovery unit that provides a basis for decision-making to reduce the risk level of 
situations; and 4) a human-computer interface.  
The system has been partially validated by a sensitivity analysis technique carried out to 
evaluate the situation models. The aim of this paper is to fully and systematically evaluate the 
performance of SASS based on SA measures. SA measures determine the degree to which 
design concepts and new technologies improve or degrade an operator’s SA [16]; they are 
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therefore a critical part of any system and procedural design process, and such evaluation efforts 
ensure that new systems, procedures or interfaces improve SA rather than degrade it. 
Attempts to measure SA unfortunately encounter difficulties, due to the lack of a universally 
accepted SA model. Measures of SA, in general, try to infer SA from other factors that are 
easier to assess (i.e. indirect measures), or attempt to obtain it directly. Indirect measures 
approach the issue by inferring how much SA an operator has acquired by assessing the 
cognitive processes that contribute to the development and maintenance of SA, or by assessing 
relevant aspects of performance in relation to the interaction between operators and systems. 
Behavioral, performance and process measures may thus be relied on to make these 
assessments; however, because the quality of decision making and task execution, independent 
of SA, may be influenced by many factors, the use of indirect measures alone to assess SA are 
not recommended [17]. Unlike indirect measures, direct metrics try to measure SA by 
comparing operators’ responses with real world situations, or by asking an expert to assess the 
quality of operators’ SA during a specific time interval. Endsley believes that workload 
assessment,  human/system performance analysis, and objective SA measurements are the best 
ways to evaluate system design [17]. Endsley et al. use SAGAT
1
, which is a direct objective 
technique, and SART
2
, which is a direct subjective technique, to assess the SA of air traffic 
controllers, using a traditional air traffic control (ATC) display and an enhanced ATC display 
[18]. They then compare the sensitivity and validity of both techniques with the results of a real-
time probe approach. The results show that the online probe approach and SART are not 
sensitive to changes in conditions, whereas the SAGAT scores are sensitive to interface 
changes. In another study, Endsley et al. utilize SAGAT and SART in the assessment of fighter 
pilots’ SA. Because there is no correlation between measures, they conclude that the objective 
SA assessment by SAGAT is not related to the subjective SA assessment by SART [19]. 
Salmon et al. also utilize SAGAT and SART to assess participants’ SA during a military 
planning task [20]. They conclude that different SA measures assess different aspects of SA. 
The literature review reveals that the majority of SA measurement applications are limited to 
aviation and military domains, and their usefulness in evaluating safety-critical decision support 
systems has not been studied sufficiently. 
In this paper, a multi-perspective approach considering three SA metrics is utilized to 
evaluate the suitability of SASS. The approach includes two direct SA measures, i.e. SAGAT 
and SART, and one workload measure called NASA-TLX
3
 which is a multi-dimensional scale 
                                                          
1 Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique 
2 Situation Awareness Rating Technique 
3 NASA Task Load Index 
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to estimate operator workload. The evaluation process of SASS is conducted with the 
participation of ten operators in a counterbalanced within-subjects design. 
The paper is organized as follows. The background of this research related to measuring SA 
is presented in Section 2. Section 3 briefly describes the elements of SASS. The description of a 
residue treater at a chemical plant, which is used for the SASS evaluation, is provided in Section 
4. The multi-perspective evaluation approach is introduced in Section 5. Lastly, the conclusion 
and future works are outlined in Section 6. 
2 Measuring Situation Awareness 
More than thirty different approaches to SA measurement have been identified and can be 
generally categorized as belonging to one of two groups: direct measures and indirect measures. 
Direct measures can also be grouped into subjective and objective metrics. This section reviews 
the common direct measures of SA. 
2.1 Subjective Measures 
Subjective SA assessment requires the quality of operators’ SA to be rated, either by 
operators themselves or by an expert observer during a specified period. The rating results can 
then be utilized to compare the quality of SA in various systems. This kind of measure can be 
broken down into the following two groups: 
 Self-rating techniques assess the confidence of participants in their SA. In these techniques, 
participants use a rating scale to provide a subjective rating of their perceived SA. The self-
rating techniques are quick, easy, and low cost, and as they are administered post-trial, they 
are non-intrusive. However, there are several problems associated with the post-trial data 
collection of SA because there is a correlation between SA and performance. In addition, 
there are a number of issues in respect of their sensitivity [20]. SART, based on Taylor’s SA 
theory [4], is a self-rating technique which, at the conclusion of an operation, is administered 
to participants who subjectively rate their SA based on a 10-dimensional bipolar scale. The 
participants’ ratings on each of the 10 items are combined to form a rating for each of the 
three major categories, namely understanding, attention demand, and attention supply. An 
overall rating is then generated. Although SART can effectively provide information about 
participants’ confidence in their SA, it can be influenced by performance outcome. In other 
words, a person may rate his/her SA higher when the task is performed successfully and a 
positive outcome is achieved. SART can also be influenced by memory decay when 
assessment is conducted at the end of the event. More importantly, participants may not 
accurately assess their own SA because they do not know what they do not know [21]. The 
use of SART applications has mostly been reported in the domain of air traffic control [21, 
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22]. Another self-rating approach is the SA-SWORD
1
 in which operators evaluate systems by 
comparative analysis using a nine-point scale. Each level of the scale represents an operator’s 
estimation of the amount of SA that is provided by each system. Further evaluation studies 
are needed to prove the effectiveness and accuracy of SA-SWORD [17]. 
 Observer rating approaches involve the observation of participants during task performance 
by subject matter experts (SMEs) who then rate the participants’ SA. Typically, the SA 
ratings are based on pre-defined observable SA-related behaviors exhibited by participants 
during task performance. Observer rating techniques have several advantages. They can be 
used during real-time activities and have no impact on the task being performed. However, 
greater scientific review is necessary because their validity is inconclusive [20]. The 
SABARS
2
 is an observer rating approach that has been developed to assess infantry SA in 
field training exercises [23]. The SARS
3
 represents another observer rating technique that 
consists of 31 behavioral elements in eight categories. Pilots use a six-point scale to complete 
the SARS measure for themselves and others in their units by rating each element [24]. The 
usefulness of SARS is very limited because it only considers a particular type of aircraft, 
flight skill and mission, and is therefore not easy to use in other domains. 
2.2 Objective Measures 
Objective SA assessment is achieved by conducting a direct comparison between operators’ 
SA and reality. This comparison is either made offline or is conducted online/in real time during 
a process of querying operators about certain aspects of an environment and determining the 
accuracy of responses by comparing them with reality. The objective techniques fall into the 
following two categories: 
 Freeze probe techniques administer online SA queries during a freeze in the simulation 
environment of tasks under analysis. The simulation is frozen and suspended at randomly 
selected times; user interfaces are then blanked, and the operator is asked to quickly answer 
questions about his or her current understanding of the situation. An overall SA score is 
calculated at the end of the trial by comparing the participant’s responses with the actual state 
of the system at the time of the freeze [20]. Freeze probe techniques do not suffer from issues 
associated with collecting SA data post-trial; they measure SA via the information in working 
memory because operators do not have access to displays when they answer the questions 
[25]. The most popular freeze probe technique is SAGAT, which was developed by Endsley 
to assess pilots’ SA [18]. The application of SAGAT can be found in air traffic control [26], 
                                                          
1 Situation Awareness-Subjective Workload Dominance Technique 
2 Situation Awareness Behavioral Rating Scale 
3 Situational Awareness Rating Scale 
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commercial and military aviation [27], nuclear power plants [28], and simulated air traffic 
management [25]. 
 Real-time probe techniques, unlike freeze probe techniques, include the online administration 
of SA queries with no freezing of the operation. The queries are developed by SMEs prior to 
the task, or during task performance, and administered as the participant performs the task. 
Response content and response time are used to measure the participant’s SA. Because there 
is no task freeze in this assessment, the level of intrusiveness of these techniques is lower 
than that of freeze probe approaches [17]. The SPAM
1
 is a real-time probe technique which 
was specifically developed to assess air traffic controllers’ SA [29]. It is based on the theory 
that operators who have good SA respond to the probes more quickly because they know 
where to look to find a particular piece of information in the environment. Questions are 
concurrently asked of operators while they are performing activities and have full access to 
their displays, and response time is considered as a measure of operators’ SA.  
3 The Situation Awareness Support System 
The situation awareness support system, or SASS, has been developed according to the 
practice of design research [30] proposed for the development of information systems, and is 
based on an SA-oriented design process [31] established to guide the development of SA 
support systems. The SA-oriented design process consists of SA considerations, including SA 
requirements analysis, SA-oriented design principles to enhance SA, and SA measurement to 
evaluate the design. The SASS requirements were determined by goal-directed task analysis 
(GDTA), as summarized in Table 1, and the SASS model was developed as shown in Figure 1 
[1]. 
3.1 The Knowledge-Base 
A situation is defined as a collection of objects that have relationships with one another and 
the environment, and a hazardous situation is defined as a circumstance that exists immediately 
before harm is produced by the hazard. Therefore, a hazardous situation is defined as an 
abnormal situation if its risk is not acceptable [1]. A combination of cognitive engineering 
procedures and hazard identification methods is carried out to discover hazardous situations. 
Analysis of written materials and documentation, observation of operator performance, expert 
elicitation and formal questionnaires may help with this determination [31]. In many safety-
critical systems, hazardous situations have been foreseen during the design and implementation 
phases, and various models have been developed to identify them. The identified situations, 
which are modeled based on Bayesian networks, as described in [32], establish the knowledge-
                                                          
1 Situation Present Assessment Method 
Page | 7 
 
base of SASS. The knowledge-base is verified in a participatory environment to ensure that the 
breadth of issues is identified. 
Table 1: Safety goals, decisions and SA requirement 
Goal: Eliminate or reduce the risks to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable 
Subgoal 1: Determine the risks 
Decision 1-1: Hazardous situation identification 
 L1: Objects and relationships which contribute to creating a hazardous situation  
 L1: Situations and relationships which contribute to creating a hazardous situation 
 L2: Hazardous situations that threaten the system 
Decision 1-2: Probability determination 
 L1: Objects which are relevant to contributors to the hazardous situation  
 L1: Observable variables which are relevant to the hazardous situation 
 L2: Prior probability of the hazardous situation 
 L3: Posterior probability of the hazardous situation 
Decision 1-3: Severity determination 
 L2: Possible consequences of the hazardous situation 
 L3: Degree of loss 
 
Decision 1-4: Risk level estimation  
 L2: Probability of the hazardous situation (Decision 1-2) 
 L2: Severity of the hazardous situation (Decision 1-3) 
 L3: Current level of risk  
Subgoal 2: Reduce the risks 
Decision 2-1: Choosing practical options  
 L2: Available reduction and containment options 
Decision 2-2: Options impact prediction 
 L2: The severity of the hazardous situation 
 L3: Projecting the new probability of the hazardous situation  
 L3: New level of risk 
 L3= Projection of SA; L2= Comprehension of SA; L1= Perception of SA. 
3.2 The Situation Data Collection Unit 
Observable variables in the environment are obtained from field sensors by the situation data 
collection unit, based on SCADA
1
 systems. As the observable variables extracted from sensors 
are continuous, a discretization process is conducted to prepare them for use as evidence in 
DBN-based models. 
3.3 The Situation Assessment Unit 
The situation assessment unit generates an assessment level of risk for every situation and 
shows whether or not the risk level is acceptable. According to the proposed modeling method, 
a DBN-based situational network provides the prior and posterior probabilities of a situation, the 
situation's severity is calculated by a consequence severity matrix, and a fuzzy logic system 
(FLS) is then utilized to estimate the situational risk level. 
3.4 The Situation Recovery Unit 
                                                          
1
 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
Page | 8 
 
The situation recovery unit provides a basis for operator decision-making to recover the 
situation if its estimated risk is unacceptable. The DBN-based situational network simulates the 
impact of risk recovery decisions for the situation, and the situation assessment unit estimates 
the new risk level. The aim is to eliminate the risk level of situations, or reduce it to an 
acceptable level.  
 
Figure 1: The situation awareness support system model [1]. 
3.5 The Human-Computer Interface 
The SASS graphical user interface (GUI) was developed based on the capabilities of Object 
Oriented BNs (OOBNs). As modeling the situational network in many safety-critical systems 
has a number of variables that lead to complex models, OOBNs that comprise both instance 
nodes and usual nodes were used to develop the interface. A complex BN can be decentralized 
using OOBNs as a hierarchy of sub-networks with desired levels of abstraction that facilitate the 
construction of the model and allow communication between the sub-networks to be performed 
more effectively. In addition, the prototype triggers an alarm for every situation that has a risk 
level in excess of ―tolerable not acceptable‖. 
4 Intended Safety-Critical Environment 
On 28 August 2008, a runaway chemical reaction occurred at a methomyl production unit in 
Institute, West Virginia, USA. Highly flammable solvent sprayed from a 4,500 gallon pressure 
vessel known as a residue treater and immediately ignited, killing two employees and injuring 
eight firefighters and contractors. The intense fire burned for more than four hours, more than 
40,000 residents were evacuated to shelter-in-place for over three hours, and the highway was 
closed for many hours because of smoke disruption to traffic [33]. The investigation report 
shows that deviation from the written start-up procedures and bypassing critical safety devices 
were the contributing factors to the runaway chemical reaction and loss of containment of the 
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flammable and toxic chemicals. A poor process mimic screen of the new DCS
1
, which could not 
provide adequate SA for the board operator, was another important contributing factor [34]. 
4.1 Plant Description 
Methomyl is classified as a carbamate insecticide and is a white crystalline solid with a slight 
sulfurous odor. It is usually produced from methyl isocyanate (MIC). MIC can cause a highly 
exothermic reaction if mixed with water, therefore it needs to be stored in stainless steel or glass 
containers at temperatures below 40 °C. The production process of methomyl, as illustrated in 
Figure 2, starts with the production of methylthioacetaldoxime (MSAO) by reacting 
chloroacetaldoxime with sodium methyl mercaptide. The MSAO then reacts with MIC to 
produce methomyl. The crystallizers remove excess MIC from the methomyl-solvent solution 
by adding an anti-solvent that causes the methomyl to crystallize. Lastly, a centrifuge separates 
the crystallized methomyl from the solvents. The methomyl cake is dried, packaged and moved 
to the warehouse. The liquid residue in the centrifuge contains very small quantities of 
methomyl and other impurities [34]. 
Figure 2: Methomyl synthesis process flow [34]. 
As can be seen from Figure 3, the solvent recovery flasher separates the solvents and 
recycles them to the beginning of the process. The accumulated liquid in the bottom of the 
flasher, called ―flasher bottoms‖, includes unvaporized solvents and impurities containing up to 
22 percent methomyl. The flasher bottoms are used as fuel in the facility’s steam boilers after 
the methomyl concentration has been reduced to less than 0.5 percent by weight. This rate is 
essential for environmental and processing considerations [34].  
                                                          
1
 DCS is a dedicated system used to control manufacturing processes; it is connected to sensors and actuators and uses set-point 
controls to control process variables 
Page | 10 
 
Figure 3: Methomyl centrifuge and solvent recovery process flow [34]. 
The incoming flasher bottoms are diluted in a 4500-gallon pressure vessel (50 psig is the 
maximum allowable operating pressure) called a residue treater, as shown in Figure 4. The 
concentration of methomyl in the flasher bottom stream will be below 0.5 percent by weight if 
the residue treater is operated at a high enough temperature, with sufficient residence time, to 
decompose the content. An auxiliary fuel tank is used to store the solvent and residual waste 
material and subsequently transfer them to the facility’s steam boiler, where they will be used as 
fuel. Toxic and flammable vapor generated in the methomyl decomposition reaction is removed 
when it exits through the vent condenser to the process vent system [34].  
Figure 4: Residue treater piping system layout [34]. 
Two kinds of operation for a residue treater can be considered: Startup and Routine. During 
startup, the residue treater is manually pre-filled with solvent to a minimum level of 30 percent. 
This means that the operation will not start at a lower level. The solvent is heated by steam that 
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flows through the heater. When the liquid temperature has increased to set-point limit, the steam 
flow valve is closed, recirculation flow is redirected from the heater to the cooler, and routine 
operation is started. In this study, routine operation is considered in the modeling of situations. 
4.2 Observable Variables 
There are several transmitters in the environment that provide the online condition for the 
residue treater. Discrete states of the observable variables are determined in terms of operation 
and safety set-points, as shown in Table 2: 
 Liquid level: A level transmitter indicates the residue treater liquid level (L). The 
routine operation is not started at a level lower than 30 percent, and the maximum 
permissible level of liquid is 50 percent. The value range of the liquid level variable is 
divided into three states: Low, Normal and High.  
 Recirculation flow: During the operation, a pump provides a steady state of 
recirculation, and a flow transmitter measures the flow of liquid through the 
recirculation pipeline. The measurement is converted to electrical signals and sent to the 
DCS by the flow transmitter. This allows operators to visualize the amount of liquid 
being transferred through the cooling cycle during routine operation. The value range of 
recirculation flow (F) is divided into three states: Very Low, Low, and Normal. 
 Temperature: The content of the residue treater should be maintained around 135°C to 
decompose the incoming methomyl quickly and prevent the accumulation of methomyl 
at an unsafe concentration inside the residue treater. A temperature transmitter measures 
the residue treater temperature (T). The temperature value range is divided into three 
states: Low, Normal, and High. 
 Pressure: The maximum allowable operating pressure of the residue treater is 50 psig, 
but it is normally operated at 20 psig. A pressure transmitter indicates the residue treater 
pressure (P). The pressure value range is divided into three states: Normal, High, and 
Very High. 
Table 2: Safety set-points of observable variables. 
Observable variable States Definition 
Liquid Level (L) 
Low        
Normal          
High       
Recirculation Flow (F) 
Very low        
Low          
Normal       
Temperature (T) 
Low         
Normal            
High        
Pressure (P) 
Normal        
High          
Very high       
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4.3 Situation Models 
Several possible hazardous situations in the environment are determined as follows [33]: 
 Situation of vent condenser failure (SVC) 
 Situation of high liquid level (SHL) 
 Situation of abnormal recirculation (SAR) 
 Situation of high pressure (SHP) 
 Situation of high temperature (SHT) 
 Situation of high concentration of methomyl (SHC) 
 Situation of runaway reaction (SRR) 
The description of situation objects is presented in Table 3, and the conditional probability 
tables (CPTs) of focal objects that represent the situations and the CPTs of other objects are 
determined according to our proposed method, as described in [35]. The possible consequences 
are determined as shown in Table 4, based on the method described in [32]. A situational 
network is then developed as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: The situational network. 
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Table 3: Situations and their objects. 
Situation/Objects Symbol Failure probability 
SVC  
Loss of chilled cooling water supply LCW 3.66E-05 
Cooling water isolation valve is inadvertently closed CWC 2.00E-02 
Cooling water isolation valve is plugged CWP 6.91E-03 
SHL 
Level transmitter LT 1.40E-04 
Automatic feed valve AFV 2.02E-05 
Automatic feed control AFC OR gate 
Automatic discharge valve ADV 2.75E-05 
Automatic discharge control ADC OR gate 
Automatic level control ALC OR gate 
Failure of operator in operating manual valves FOL 2.70E-01 
Manual feed valve MFV 1.40E-01 
Manual discharge valve MDV 1.40E-01 
Manual level control MLC OR gate 
SAR 
Flow transmitter FT 7.13E-06 
Recirculation pump RP 4.00E-02 
Temperature sensor in recirculation TS 4.00E-02 
Automatic water valve AWV 8.68E-06 
Automatic cooler system ACS OR gate 
SHP   
Pressure transmitter PT 1.64E-01 
Automatic relief valve (mechanical failure) ARV 3.40E-01 
Automatic pressure control APC OR gate 
Failure of operator in operating manual valve FOP 2.70E-01 
Manual relief valve MRV 1.39E-01 
Manual pressure control MPC OR gate 
High pressure protection system HPP AND gate 
Accumulating deposits at vent condenser piping AD 4.95E-06 
Situation of vent condenser failure SVC NA 
Inadequate ventilation IV OR gate 
SHT  
Temperature transmitter TT 6.84E-06 
Situation of abnormal recirculation SAR NA 
Automatic temperature control ATC OR gate 
Failure of operator to notice temperature change FOT 1.00E-01 
Manual water valve MWV 1.39E-06 
Manual temperature control MTC OR gate 
SHC   
Situation of high liquid level SHL NA 
Situation of high temperature  SHT NA 
SRR 
Situation of high pressure SHP NA 
Situation of high concentration of methomyl SHC NA 
Air monitor system AM 0.18E-06 
Fire alarm FA 1.30E-03 
Fire cannon FC 4.00E-01 
Ignition barrier IB 1.00E-01 
 
Table 4: The consequence node states. 
Consequence Symbol Loss ($) 
Explosion with high death and high property damage C1 1E+07 
Fire with high death and moderate property damage C2 7E+06 
Fire with low death and high property damage C3 5E+06 
Fire with low death and moderate property damage C4 4E+06 
Ruptured vessel with vapor cloud with possibility of ignition C5 3E+06 
Safe evacuation C6 1E+06 
Safe state C7 0E+00 
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4.4 Virtual Environment Interface 
The virtual environment interface, shown in Figure 6, displays the necessary information for 
operators to monitor the operation of the residue treater unit and manipulate the components. 
The virtual environment enables an operator to experience the nominal and critical plant 
conditions and to learn how to control the plant, prevent accidents, manage emergencies, and 
improve maintenance. This environment provides a basis for personnel to experience risky 
situations without paying the consequences (e.g., compromising production, endangering plant 
personnel and the surrounding population, contaminating the environment, jeopardizing 
relationships with local authorities, or increasing insurance premiums). In addition, as 
experienced during the VIRTHUALIS project [36, 37], the rehearsal of specific events allows 
process understanding to be improved through testing a number of occurrences that will 
fortunately not usually take place during the lifetime of the plant, and which cannot therefore be 
learned and experienced on the job. The other advantage of the virtual environment is that by 
presenting abnormal situations, decision-makers are able to measure human capabilities that 
cannot be measured in the field. 
In the intended virtual environment, flow directions are indicated by vertical and horizontal 
lines between components. Instantaneous values, i.e. pressure, flow rate, liquid level and 
temperature, are displayed as gauge values adjacent to their respective components. If the values 
exceed high or low limits, the system triggers an alarm and indicates to the user that flashing 
values are values that have fallen outside their allowable range. By mouse-clicking any 
component, the user interface provides a pop-up window that presents the available options, 
such as deactivating the alarm or turning the system pumps on and off, as well as offering 
maintenance suggestions. 
4.5 The SASS Interface  
The human-computer interface of SASS is shown in Figure 7. Modeling the situational 
network for the residue treater led to complex models, and OOBNs were therefore used to 
develop the SASS interface. Mouse-clicking any situation in the interface opens a pop-up 
window that contains the related sub-network, including contributing objects, their failure 
probability, and the most probable explanation for the hazardous situation.  
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Figure 6: The virtual environment interface. 
Figure 7: The situation awareness support system interface. 
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5 A Multi-Perspective Evaluation Approach 
Our multi-perspective evaluation approach, illustrated in Figure 8, consists of SAGAT, 
SART and NASA-TLX metrics to measure different aspects of operators’ SA. SAGAT assesses 
SA by comparing the real-time conditions of the environment with the probe answers reported 
by the operator. Operator-in-the-loop simulation exercises are managed by a personal computer 
that employs the design concepts of interest; in our case, the virtual environment interface alone 
in one monitor and the SASS interface in an adjacent monitor. The simulation activity is 
suspended at randomly selected intervals, the displays are blanked, and queries are administered 
to the participant. Data collected by the computer are used to score the participant’s responses as 
correct or incorrect based on what was actually happening in the scenario at that time. 
SART assesses SA by asking operators to rate the quality of their SA during a specified 
period. This rating is then used to compare the quality of SA when the virtual user interface is 
used alone and when it is used with SASS. SART is inexpensive, easy to perform, simple to 
analyze, and employable without the need to disrupt performance, however it may include 
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Figure 8: A multi-perspective evaluation approach. 
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Page | 17 
 
inaccuracies due to operator self-reporting. Therefore, the use of SART in conjunction with 
SAGAT can engender confidence that the levels of operator SA provided are accurate. 
In addition to SAGAT and SART, the approach includes NASA-TLX to represent the 
workload of operators who are managing situations with both systems. To perform this 
assessment, operators answer the NASA-TLX questionnaire after each scenario. The results are 
used to determine which aspects of the work contribute the most to the operators’ perceived 
workload. Computerized SART and NASA-TLX questionnaires are administered once per 
scenario post-trial using a laptop. 
5.1 Participants 
Ten operators with good experience (M=5.40 yrs, SD=1.42) and currently involved in the 
operation of an oil refinery served as participants. All participants were made familiar with the 
simulation software and features of SASS used in the present study. Based on observed values, 
the operators had to identify abnormal situations and the actions required to address those 
abnormal situations. The test participants were introduced to the characteristics of abnormal 
situations in the environment before the evaluation. 
5.2 Experiments 
A within-subjects design, also called a repeated-measures design, was considered due to the 
number of participants. The same group of subjects participated in two treatments. 
5.2.1 Scenarios Development 
To prepare for a routine operation, the vessel is filled with solvent and heated. Methomyl is 
added to the residue treater and a normal recirculation loop flow is activated to mix the 
concentrated methomyl feed with preheated solvent in the residue treater. The operator opens 
the feed control valve and begins feeding flasher bottoms into the vessel. At normal flow rate, it 
takes approximately 10 minutes to fill the residue treater to 50 percent, the normal operating 
level. The recirculation pump is then started. Two 40-min counterbalanced scenarios are 
defined. In Scenario 1, the residue treater liquid level reaches approximately 51 percent after 17 
minutes and the temperature ranges between 130 and 135°C. The pressure is 22 psig. The 
temperature begins to rise steadily about 2 degrees per minute when the recirculation flow 
suddenly drops to zero after 30 minutes. In less than three minutes, the temperature is at 147°C, 
the highest safe operating limit. Table 5 shows the timeline of Scenario 1. 
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Table 5: Scenario 1 timeline. 
Time into 
scenario (min) 
Event 
00:00 Scenario is started 
05:00 Level reaches 30%. 
07:00 Flow is steady at normal rate and temperature is about 130°C. 
09:00 Automatic feed valve is opened and flasher bottoms are introduced into the vessel. 
17:00 Level reaches 51% and the pressure is 22 psig. 
18:00 Automatic feed valve is closed. 
23:00 The temperature begins to rise steadily about 2 degrees per minute. 
30:00 The recirculation flow suddenly drops to zero. 
31:00 The temperature is at 147 °C, the highest safe operating limit. 
31:00 The risk level of SAR increases from acceptable to tolerable not acceptable. 
32:00 The risk level of SHP is steady and acceptable. 
32:00 The risk level of SHT and SHC increases from acceptable to tolerable not acceptable. 
37:00 The risk level of SRR remains acceptable. 
39:00 Scenario is ended. 
Gases that have evolved from the methomyl decomposition reaction pass through the vent 
condenser to the flare system. The gas flow carries trace amounts of solid material into the vent 
system where they are deposited on the surface of the pipe. Over time, the accumulating 
deposits will choke the flow and cause the pressure of the residue treater to climb. In Scenario 2, 
the residue treater liquid level reaches approximately 50 percent after 10 minutes and the 
temperature is 130°C. The pressure begins to rise sharply when the vent condenser pipeline is 
blocked. Table 6 shows the timeline of Scenario 2. 
Table 6: Scenario 2 timeline. 
Time into 
scenario (min) 
Event 
00:00 Scenario is started 
04:00 Flow is steady at normal rate. 
05:00 Automatic feed valve is opened and flasher bottoms are introduced into the vessel. 
10:00 Level reaches 50%, temperature is 130°C, and automatic feed valve is closed. 
15:00 Vent condenser piping is blocked by accumulating deposits. 
17:00 Pressure is starting to rise sharply. 
19:00 The pressure is at 25 psig, in the high state of its safe operating limit. 
22:00 The risk level of SVC increases from acceptable to tolerable not acceptable. 
25:00 The risk level of SHC remains acceptable. 
25:00 The risk level of SHP increases from acceptable to tolerable not acceptable.  
36:00 The risk level of SRR remains acceptable. 
39:00 Scenario is ended. 
 
5.2.2 Within-Subjects Design 
The within-subjects design has the advantage of having high statistical power and a 
reduction in the error variance associated with individual differences. However, a fundamental 
disadvantage of the within-subjects design is the phenomenon of ―practice effects‖, which are 
caused by the practice and growing experience of the participants as they move through the 
sequence of conditions. This effect is due to the participants’ growing familiarity with the 
procedures. To control for this effect, the order in which the scenarios are presented to the 
participants needs to be randomly determined or counterbalanced. Counterbalancing was 
therefore performed by randomly placing participants in two groups and presenting conditions 
to each group in a different order, as shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Experimental orders. 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Group 1 VE+SASS VE 
Group 2 VE VE+SASS 
Note: VE: Virtual Environment, SASS: Situation Awareness Support System 
5.3 Objective Measurement 
Situation awareness was first measured by applying SAGAT. The operators executed the 
experimental scenarios using the virtual environment user interface with or without SASS, as 
ordered in Table 7. Five freezes occurred at randomly selected intervals and could not be 
predicted by the operators. At the time of the freeze, the displays were blanked and the 
simulations were suspended. Each freeze lasted approximately two minutes. The 13 questions 
summarized in Table 8 were derived from the GDTA results shown in Table 1 and were asked 
in the first trial, and the questions summarized in Table 9 were administered in the second trial. 
Table 8: Probe questions for Scenario 1. 
Time into 
scenario (min) 
SA 
level 
Question 
07:00 Level 1 What is the current level of temperature? (Low, Normal, High) 
07:00 Level 1 What is the current level of flow? (Very low, Low, Normal) 
18:00 Level 1 Climbing, decreasing, or steady: Which is correct for liquid level?  
24:00 Level 2 Which abnormal situation threatens the unit? (SHL, SVC, SAR) 
24:00 Level 2 What is the most probable explanation? (Failure of the recirculation pump, Failure of cooling 
water isolation valve, Failure of automatic level control) 
24:00 Level 3 What is the current level of risk of the abnormal situation? (Acceptable, Tolerable acceptable, 
Tolerable not acceptable, Not acceptable) 
31:00 Level 1 Climbing, decreasing, or steady: Which is correct for temperature? 
31:00 Level 2 Which abnormal situations threaten the unit? (SHT, SHC, SRR) 
31:00 Level 2 What are the best actions for reduction or containment of risk? 
31:00 Level 3 What will be the level of risk? (Acceptable, Tolerable acceptable, Tolerable not acceptable, Not 
acceptable) 
32:00 Level 3 What are the risk levels of SHT and SHC? (Acceptable, Tolerable acceptable, Tolerable not 
acceptable, Not acceptable) 
32:00 Level 2 What are the best actions for reduction or containment of risk? (Temperature transmitter, Manual 
water valve, Automatic feed valve) 
32:00 Level 3 Is SRR abnormal? (Yes, No) 
 
Table 9: Probe questions for Scenario 2. 
Time into 
scenario (min) 
SA 
level 
Question 
10:00 Level 1 What is the current level of temperature? (Low, Normal, High) 
10:00 Level 1 What is the current level of pressure? (Very low, Low, Normal) 
17:00 Level 1 Climbing, decreasing, or steady: Which is correct for pressure?  
17:00 Level 2 Which abnormal situation threatens the unit? (SVC, SHT, SAR) 
17:00 Level 2 What is the most probable explanation? (Failure of the recirculation pump, Failure of cooling 
water isolation valve, Failure of automatic level control) 
22:00 Level 3 What is the current level of risk of the abnormal situation? (Acceptable, Tolerable acceptable, 
Tolerable not acceptable, Not acceptable) 
25:00 Level 1 Climbing, decreasing, or steady: Which is correct for temperature? 
25:00 Level 2 Which abnormal situations threaten the unit? (SHT, SHC, SRR) 
25:00 Level 2 What are the best actions for reduction or containment of risk? 
25:00 Level 3 What will be the level of risk? (Acceptable, Tolerable acceptable, Tolerable not acceptable, Not 
acceptable) 
33:00 Level 3 What are the risk levels of SHT and SHC? (Acceptable, Tolerable acceptable, Tolerable not 
acceptable, Not acceptable) 
33:00 Level 2 What are the best actions for reduction or containment of risk? (Loss of chilled cooling water 
supply, Cooling water isolation valve is inadvertently closed) 
33:00 Level 3 Is SRR abnormal? (Yes, No) 
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The responses to all the queries were collected at each stop via an online questionnaire 
system adjacent to the operator’s station. All responses were scored as 1 for a correct answer 
and 0 for an incorrect answer. The total SAGAT scores were calculated by summing all the 
correct responses for each participant, giving a possible total score of 13. Table 10 shows the 
SAGAT scores under different systems. 
Table 10: The SAGAT scores under different systems. 
System SA level 
 Perception  Comprehension  Projection  Overall 
 M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
VE 3.10 0.76  0.60 0.48  0.80 0.17  4.50 2.27 
VE+SASS 3.80 0.17  4.50 0.27  3.30 0.45  11.60 1.37 
The mean total SAGAT score without using SASS is 4.50 (SD =2.27). The highest total 
SAGAT score is 7 and the lowest score is 3. The mean overall SAGAT score for level 1 SA 
probes is 3.10 (SD = 0.76) while it is 0.60 (SD = 0.48) and 0.80 (SD =0.17) for levels 2 and 3, 
respectively. As can be seen, the SAGAT scores for levels 2 and 3 are much lower in 
comparison to level 1.The mean total SAGAT score with the support of SASS is 11.60 (SD 
=1.37). The highest total SAGAT score is 13 and the lowest SAGAT score is 9. The SAGAT 
score decomposition corresponding to SA levels is 3.80 (SD = 0.17) for level 1, 4.50 (SD = 
0.27) for level 2, and 3.30 (SD = 0.45) for level 3. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows that 
the SAGAT rating of SA is significantly higher with the support of SASS than without 
F(1,18)=137.90 p<0.001. The results particularly indicate the improvement of SA in levels 2 
and 3 with the support of SASS. 
5.4 Subjective Measurement 
Situation awareness was also measured using SART. The SART questionnaire required 
participants to use a 1-7 scale (1=Low and 7=High) and to rate 10 factors (shown in Table 11) 
in three categories: understanding of the situation, demand on attention resources, and supply of 
attention resources. Responses to the SART questions (shown in Table 12) resulted in a score 
for each of the three major factors, as well as an overall score for SA. The overall SART score 
was calculated as SA=U-(D-S) where U is a sum for understanding, D is the summation of 
attention demand, and S is the summation of attention supply. 
Table 11: The SART factors. 
Domain Construct  Definition 
Understanding Information quantity The amount of knowledge that an operator receives and understands 
Information quality The goodness degree of knowledge that an operator gains 
Familiarity with situation The degree of being familiar with the situation 
Attention Demand Instability of situation  The situation is unstable and likely to change suddenly 
Variability of situation The number of variables in the situation that are changing 
Complexity of situation The situation is complicated or straightforward 
Attention Supply Arousal The degree of alertness that the operator has for doing the activity 
Spare mental capacity The amount of mental ability that the operator has for new variables 
Concentration of attention The number of aspects in the situation that demand the operator’s 
concentration 
Division of attention The extent to which the operator’s attention is divided 
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The SART rating of SA was inferred as being significantly higher with SASS than without 
it, F(1,18)=228.57, p<0.001. The mean overall SART score when using the virtual environment 
interface alone was 19.2 (SD=1.51) while the mean overall SART score in obtaining support of 
SASS was 27.2 (SD=1.28). As summarized in Table 12, the highest and lowest overall SART 
scores for the former were 21 and 17, and for the latter, 29 and 24. Participant scores were 
examined for each SART dimension and these showed that the result was mainly attributable to 
differences in the subject rating of understanding (p<0.001). 
  
Table 12: The operators’ responses to the SART questions. 
Operator O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 
Used Artifact A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B 
Q1 4 6 3 7 4 7 5 7 5 7 5 7 5 7 5 7 4 6 4 6 
Q2 4 6 3 6 5 6 4 6 5 6 4 7 4 6 4 6 4 6 4 6 
Q3 5 6 5 6 6 7 4 7 5 7 5 7 4 7 5 6 5 6 5 6 
Q4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 3 5 4 4 
Q5 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 5 4 4 
Q6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Q7 4 6 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 6 4 5 3 5 5 6 4 6 5 6 
Q8 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 4 5 4 5 5 6 5 6 5 7 
Q9 4 5 4 6 4 6 4 5 4 6 5 5 5 6 5 5 4 5 4 5 
Q10 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Understanding 13 18 11 19 15 20 13 20 15 20 14 21 13 20 14 19 13 18 13 18 
Attention Demand 13 13 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 13 11 13 14 14 11 15 13 13 
Attention Supply 18 22 18 20 18 20 18 21 19 22 18 20 17 20 20 22 18 22 19 23 
SART=U-(D-S) 18 27 17 26 20 27 18 28 21 29 20 28 19 27 20 27 20 25 19 28 
Note: A: Virtual Environment, B: Virtual Environment + SASS. 
5.5 Workload Measurement 
The NASA-TLX consisted of six independent sub-scales: Mental, Physical, Temporal 
Demands, Frustration, Effort, and Performance. Users were asked to rate the perceived 
workload on a continuous scale (one scale per dimension) with three anchors (low, medium, and 
high). The results of these tools could be displayed as individual workload dimensions, or as 
overall workload scores. The five questions asked are shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: The NASA-TLX questions. 
Domain Question 
Mental Demand How mentally demanding was the task? 
Temporal Demand How temporally demanding was the task?  
Performance How successful were you in accomplishing what you were asked to do? 
Effort How hard did you have to work to accomplish your level of performance? 
Frustration How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed, and annoyed were you? 
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The participants’ answers were scaled to the range of 0 to 100, as shown in Figure 9. As can 
be seen, working with SASS produces better results than working without it in four domains. In 
just one domain, i.e. performance, the results are lower when the operators use the support 
system. The average of the results from the five questions is also depicted in Figure 9. It can be 
concluded that working with the proposed SASS for this specific environment results in a lower 
workload for decision makers than working without it. 
Figure 9: NASA Task Load Index results. 
If α = 0.05 is chosen, the ANOVA analysis reveals that there is no significant effect on 
workloads in the use of the virtual environment with or without SASS, for this specific 
environment. It can generally be concluded that to prove that a better workload is produced for 
operators, SASS should be validated through a variety of scenarios in different environments 
with more participants. In addition, as the results depend strongly on the visualization of the 
user interface, the system should be evaluated using a range of visualization techniques for 
recognized situations. 
5.6 Correlation between SA Metrics 
The analysis of the correlation between SAGAT and SART is presented in Table 14. As can 
be seen, there is no significant correlation between the participants’ SA scores assessed by these 
two measures. This shows that the SART and SAGAT measurements evaluate different items in 
respect of SA during the study. In other words, they view SA differently and measure different 
elements of operator awareness. SAGAT, a probe recall approach, essentially measures the 
extent to which a participant is aware of pre-defined elements in the environment, their 
understanding of the properties of these elements in relation to the task they are performing, and 
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what the potential future states of these elements might be. SART, on the other hand, provides a 
measure of how aware participants’ perceived themselves to be during task performance (based 
on ratings of understanding, supply and demand) and does not refer to the different elements 
within the environment. Each method therefore takes a different view of what SA is and what it 
comprises and, as the lack of correlation between the measures indicates, the methods measured 
different things in the assessment of participant SA. 
Table 14: SAGAT and SART correlations. 
  SART SART U SART D SART S 
SAGAT -0.26681 Not Sig 0.285942 Not Sig -0.1122 Not Sig -0.60033Not Sig 
SAGAT Level 1 -0.37139 Not Sig 0.149256Not Sig 0.234261Not Sig -0.37139Not Sig 
SAGAT Level 2 -0.37139Not Sig -0.0995 Not Sig -0.37139Not Sig -0.37139Not Sig 
SAGAT Level 3 0.058001 Not Sig 0.481736 Not Sig -0.21951Not Sig -0.52201Not Sig 
The correlation results are consistent with other SA measure comparison studies such as [19] 
and [20], in which SAGAT and SART were utilized by the former in the assessment of fighter 
pilots’ SA and by the latter to assess participants’ SA during a military planning task. Both 
studies reported that there was no correlation between measures. Subjective measures of SA 
have also been criticized from a number of other dimensions. Nowadays, it is believed that 
measures like SART are recognized as measures of meta-SA [29]. Whether observer judgments 
of SA are good or not seems to depend entirely on the observable features. If those features are 
unambiguously reflective of understanding the situation—as would be the case with implicit 
performance features—then observation by another person might be acceptable.  However, it is 
critical that what is observed is SA and not performance. 
6 Conclusion and Future Work 
The importance of cognitive decision support systems for managing abnormal situations in 
safety-critical environments has been highlighted. A situation awareness support system (SASS) 
that assists operators to understand and project situations in such environments was developed 
in our previous study [1] and has been partially validated by a sensitivity analysis carried out to 
evaluate the knowledge-base of the system. To fully and systematically evaluate SASS, it needs 
to be empirically tested to identify unforeseen issues that might negatively impact operator SA. 
Therefore, appropriate measures must be employed to assess the level of operator SA in their 
interaction with SASS. This paper demonstrates a multi-perspective approach for this purpose. 
The approach consists of two direct SA measurements, SAGAT and SART, and a workload 
metric called NASA-TLX. SAGAT is an objective measure of SA that assesses a participant’s 
SA by querying the participant on the pertinent SA requirements relevant in randomly-timed 
freezes for the domain of interest. SART is also a subjective measure that provides an 
assessment of SA by some systems based on operators' subjective opinions. NASA-TLX is a 
widely-used, multidimensional assessment tool that rates perceived workload, or a team's 
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effectiveness, or other aspects of performance, in order to assess a system. Ten experienced 
operators participated in a counterbalanced within-subjects experiment to respond to the 
simulation scenarios using a virtual environment, with and without the support of SASS. The 
results show that SASS improves operator SA, particularly in levels 2 and 3. However, its effect 
on operator workload needs more investigation. 
The proposal for the future direction of this research is to optimize SASS based on the 
design principles of SA-oriented design processes, which have been established to guide the 
development of systems that support SA. These principles include general guidelines for coping 
with automation and complexity, the design of alarm systems, and the presentation of 
information uncertainty. It has been shown that SASS aids SA, thus another future direction 
would be to investigate how SASS aids performance. 
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